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PHARMACEUTICAL TORT LIABILITY:
A JUSTIFIABLE NEMESIS TO DRUG
INNOVATION AND ACCESS?
PAULA JACOBI*

"StatesRation Low Supply of 5 Vaccines for Children"1
"Schering-Ploughto Start Wait List for
HepatitisDrug"'
"DrugShortages Impacting Trauma Centers"'
"ContraceptiveResearch Has Been Stalled for over a Generationin
the United States"'
INTRODUCTION

These headlines tell a story of the persistent and growing
shortage of critical drugs and vaccines in America.' The threat of
uncertain tort liability has led pharmaceutical manufacturers to
either selectively or completely abandon the drug and vaccine

" J.D., January 2005.
1. Robert Pear, States Ration Low Supply of 5 Vaccines for Children, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2002, at A20.
2. Geeta Anand, Schering-Plough to Start Wait List for Hepatitis Drug,
WALL ST. J., Jan 16, 2002, at B14.
3. Drug Shortages Impacting Trauma Centers, J. OF TRAUMA NURSING,
Apr. 1, 2003, at 50.
4. William M. Brown, Dgjd vu All over Again: The Exodus from
Contraceptive Research and How to Reverse It, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 1, 32-33
(2001) (discussing the fear of product liability and punitive damage awards
driving pharmaceutical manufacturers out of contraceptive research).
5. For a bulletin of drugs in shortage, see the Drug Shortage Resource
Center website maintained by the American Society of Health-System
Pharmacists, at http'//www.ashp.org/shortage (last visited May 25, 2005). The
website identifies the short and "long-term unavailability" of common drugs as
increasing significantly in the 1990's. Consequences include increases in
medication errors and adverse reactions, sub-optimal treatment alternatives
and procedure delays. These compromises generate an "economic drain" from
the additional staff time involved in tracking shortages and resolving their
ultimate impact on patient care.
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market.' Research has halted, consumer costs have escalated and
drug access problems reign.8 From a public policy perspective, this
is a situation with far reaching societal implications.9
Part I of this Comment examines historical and present day
drug shortages, including factors which contribute to this
problem-most notably tort liability. Part II discusses dual
regulation of the pharmaceutical industry through the legislative
mandates of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA")"
and state tort drug product liability. Part III considers three
alternatives to minimize the impact pharmaceutical tort liability
has on the drug industry.
Finally, Part IV recommends
implementation of a narrowly defined regulatory compliance
6. See Gary J. Spahn & Dabney J. Carr IV, Runaway Jury Verdicts in
Pharmaceutical, Device Cases: A Message Worth Listening to,
PHARMACEUTICAL & MED. DEVICE L. BULL., Feb. 2002, at 1 (citing as
examples $100 million verdict against a manufacturer for "severe
gastroesophageal disease," $56.5 million and $13.3 million verdicts involving
diet drugs and supplements and a $6.4 million verdict against a manufacturer
of an antidepressant). Even where courts recognize inappropriate damage
awards, the cost of appealing verdicts justifies settling out of court for
manufacturers unwilling to risk "the legal and financial uncertainties
involved." W. Kip Viscusi, CorporateRisk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 547, 584-85 (2000).
7. Richard L. Manning, Products Liability and PrescriptionDrug Prices in
Canada and the United States, 40 J.L. & ECON. 203, 234 (1997) (comparing
drug prices in Canada and the United States and positing that the large price
differentials observed were explained by the cost of actual and potential
liability). This GAO finding demonstrated that the cost of tort liability
increased the median price of a drug by one third and doubled the average
drug price differential. Id.
8. Drug Access: Shortages of Key Drugs Give Hospitals Headaches, MED.
LETTER ON CDC & FDA, Jan. 19, 2003, at 14 [hereinafter Shortages Give
Hospitals Headaches]. See also Drug Shortages Impacting Trauma Centers,
supra note 3, at 50 (describing as examples recent shortages of
methylprednisolone, hydrocortisone and all vaccines containing tetanus).
9. Public policy implications are seen with common childhood illnesses
that are often treated "off-label." Lauren Hammer Breslow, The Best
Pharmaceuticalsfor Children Act of 2002: The Rise of the Voluntary Incentive
Structure and CongressionalRefusal to Require PediatricTesting, 40 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 133, 146 (2003). "We are operating in a vacuum .... I might be
able to treat [children's] cancer more aggressively, but I don't know how to
safely do that." Id. at 146 (quoting Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Children Test New
Medicines Despite Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, § 1, at 1). See also
Gregory C. Jackson, PharmaceuticalProduct Liability May Be Hazardous to
Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to Concurrent Regulation, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 199, 206 (1992) (discussing the social costs attributed to the deferral by
manufacturers of testing of an HIV vaccine due to the product liability
climate); David C. Mowery & Violaine Mitchell, Improving the Reliability of
the U.S. Vaccine Supply: An Evaluation of Alternatives, 20 J. HEALTH POL.
POLVY & L. 973, 974 (1995) (citing the importance of an effective immunization
program to avoid the cost of responding to an infectious disease outbreak and
to general maintenance of the public health).
10. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000).
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defense coupled with expansion of incentive programs where
research has stalled or liability exposure has driven drug product
lines off the market.
I.

SIGNS, SYMPTOMS AND THE CULPRIT

The casualties in research and development resulting from
tort liability and dual regulation of the pharmaceutical industry
span the broad spectrum of drugs and biologicals. Three classes of
pharmaceuticals clearly demonstrate the magnitude of this
problem: vaccines, reproductive and pediatric drugs.11 Although
not limited to these categories, drug shortages, including total
abandonment of production, are routine obstacles for physicians
and pharmacists in the treatment of patients.12
A.

The Vaccine Experience

Serious injuries from vaccines are rare, but unavoidable. 3 In
spite of this risk, the "undeniable health benefits achieved through
[immunization]" make vaccination "among the single most
A public health
effective [means] of health intervention." 4
emergency arose in the 1970's and early 1980's when the
pharmaceutical industry was hit with $3.5 billion in tort suits
alleging injury to children under a mandated immunization
program." The exposure to large damage awards provided the
economic justification for companies to stop research and
production. 6 As a result, vaccine stockpiles declined, prices rose
dramatically and industry consolidation occurred. 7 The industry's

11. See Breslow, supra note 9, at 141-42 (discussing the problems
surrounding each class of pharmaceuticals).
12. Lars Noah, Triage in the Nation's Medicine Cabinet: The Puzzling
Scarcity of Vaccines and Other Drugs, 54 S.C. L. REV. 371, 373 (2002); Note, A
Question of Competence: The Judicial Role in the Regulation of
Pharmaceuticals,103 HARV. L. REV. 773, 775 (1990) [hereinafter A Question of
Competence].
13. See Elizabeth A. Breen, A One Shot Deal: The National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 309, 313-14 (1999) (noting that
fewer than 100 children suffered fatal adverse reactions in over 100 million
doses of vaccine administered, with "nonfatal reactions ... similarly scarce").
14. Breen, supra note 13, at 311-12. Vaccine litigation is an example of a
jury's focus on individual plaintiffs rather than the statistical benefit of
vaccines to the public in general. Viscusi, supra note 6, at 582. A CDC study
concluded that in the "absence of the pertussis vaccine program," over 320,000
cases of whooping cough would result in 400 deaths annually. Id.
15. Breslow, supra note 9, at 140-41.
16. Jackson, supra note 9, at 205. "There is little doubt that [the] decline in
vaccine availability is due to the overwhelming burden of product liability."
Jackson cites as one example a punitive damage award totaling two
Id.
hundred times the vaccine's annual revenues. Id.
17. Breslow, supra note 9, at 140-41. During the height of the vaccine crisis
the cost of the DPT vaccine rose from $0.11 to $11.40; seventy-one percent of
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response posed a serious threat to childhood vaccine supplies. 8
To address this threat to pediatric immunization, Congress
enacted the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act ("NCVIA") in
1986.1' Even with the protection afforded by the NCVIA, today
only two manufacturers of the DPT (diphtheria/pertussis/tetanus
toxoid) vaccine remain; with a single U.S. supplier of vaccines for
MMR (measles/mumps/rubella), influenza and pneumonia.0
Industry consolidation leaves vital vaccine supplies vulnerable to
physical plant issues such as maintenance, catastrophic accidents
and regulatory compliance concerns."' Limited supplies of certain
vaccines have already resulted in "rationing schemes. " '
B. Bendectin-Serving the High-Risk Consumer
Bendectin
litigation
illustrates
why pharmaceutical
manufacturers avoid drug development and marketing to one
category of high-risk consumers-pregnant women.'
Bendectin
was the only drug marketed to treat morning sickness.' After
allegations arose of birth defects in children born to mothers
taking the drug, its manufacturer, Merrell Dow, had to defend
over 2,100 lawsuits. 5 The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
launched an investigation into Bendectin's safety but failed to
reveal evidence that the drug was a teratogen."6 Consequently, the
this price increase was due to insurance. Noah, supra note 12, at 373.
18. Viscusi, supra note 6, at 582-83.
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34. See also Breslow, supra note 9, at 141.
20. Noah, supra note 12, at 374-75.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 387-88. The high cost and limited supply of Hepatitis B vaccine,
when first introduced, restricted its use to "high-risk groups." Id. Physicians
have also been advised by the CDC to defer booster immunizations for DPT
and tetanus due to short supply. Id. Rationing schemes have posed
controversial social questions. Id. at 386. Where resources are scarce-in this
case drugs-society must choose which individuals should get treatment based
on such factors as medical need, age or ability to pay. Id. To date, medical
criteria have formed the basis for handling most "micro allocation problems."
Id. at 386-87.
23. W. Kip Viscusi et al., The Effect of Products Liability Litigation on
Innovation: Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic
Rationalefor the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV.
1437, 1474-75 (1994). The withdrawal of Bendectin reaches beyond the
singular loss of this drug. Id. at 1473-74. It represents the risk that a
manufacturer can be held liable in court for products used in pregnancy in
spite of an FDA judgment of a drug's safety. Id. There is a significant
incentive for companies to choose product lines that avoid this degree of risk.
Id. at 1474-75.
24. See Brown v. Superior Court of S.F., 751 P.2d 470, 479 (Cal. 1988)
(citing examples of products which have greatly increased in price or have
been withdrawn from the market).
25. Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life
Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 319 (1992).
26. A teratogen is an agent causing the development of congenital
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drug remained on the market. 7
Even with the backing of the scientific community, which
found no causal connection between Bendectin's use and fetal
deformity, a jury awarded "$20 million in compensatory and $75
million in punitive damages" in one case.' Although Merrell Dow
prevailed in its defense of this and other suits on appeal, the
manufacturer ultimately elected to withdraw the drug from the
market in 1983.2' The costs incurred in securing tort victories
accrued to the point where30 Merrell Dow agreed to a class action
settlement of $120 million.
C. Other Casualties
Bendectin is not an isolated failure." For example, the sole
manufacturer of Wydase, a treatment for I.V. infiltration,
discontinued production and left patients without a comparable
alternative treatment.2
Similarly, patients suffering from eye
muscle spasm previously aided by Oculinum are now without its
benefits.3
The drug's clinical testing stopped because the
manufacturer could not obtain affordable liability insurance.'
These examples demonstrate that where insurance costs exceed a
drug's potential value, the balance tips in favor of abandoning the
drug and the patients it could help.'
Pharmaceuticals manufactured and marketed for children
represent an equally disenfranchised segment of the drug
market.36
The size of the pediatric market, the sensitivity
deformities in a fetus.

TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY, T-17 (12th
ed. 1973).
27. Sanders, supra note 25, at 318-19. See also Richardson ex rel.
Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(affirming j.n.o.v. for defendant of a $1 million-plus verdict, noting "FDA
approval has never been rescinded").
28. Howard A.
Denemark, Improving Litigation Against Drug
Manufacturers for Failure to Warn Against Possible Side Effects: Keeping
Dubious Lawsuits from Driving Good Drugs off the Market, 40 CAS. W. RES. L.
REV. 413, 427-28 (1990).
29. Id. at 427-28; Sanders, supra note 25, at 319. A General Counsel of one
manufacturer stated: "There has to come a point with a particular product,
even a good product, where you say, that's enough, and you get out of the
market." Marc Galanter, Case Congregations and Their Careers, 24 LAW &
SoC'Y REV. 371, 381 (1990) (internal quotations omitted).
30. A Question of Competence, supra note 12, at 774.
31. Denemark, supra note 28, at 428.
32. Shortages Give HospitalsHeadaches,supra note 8, at 15.
33. A Question of Competence, supra note 12, at 774.
34. Id.
35. Shortages Give HospitalsHeadaches,supra note 8, at 14.
36. Karena J. Cooper, PediatricMarketing Exclusivity-As Altered by the
Best Pharmaceuticalsfor ChildrenAct of 2002, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 519, 520
(2002). The lack of pediatric studies and corresponding labeling of drugs for
pediatric use is premised on several factors. Id. In addition to the ethical
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associated with testing in children and the level of liability
exposure involved are all sufficient incentives to focus the industry
on "safer," more lucrative product lines. 7 Similar to the exodus
that occurred in the contraceptive market,' drug companies
learned a lesson from the vaccine experience. "The industry would
be resoundingly punished in the courtroom for injuring women's
reproductive capabilities, their fetuses, or their children.""
A quote from the director of pharmacy services at the New
Jersey Hospital Association reflects the everyday experience of
hospitals dealing with shortages of injectible anesthetics,
painkillers, antibiotics and steroids. ° "At any given time, it seems
there are about four dozen drug items that are near-impossible to
get."'
Therapeutic drug equivalents are not always available.
One example of the threat drug shortages pose to patient safety
occurred when three San Francisco patients died of bacterial
meningitis when a local pharmacy prepared a contaminated
mixture as a substitute for an unavailable steroid that the
patients required.'
The infrastructure and coping mechanisms available to assist
healthcare providers in managing shortages highlights the
prevalence of the access problem.' There is a department in the
FDA devoted entirely to managing drug and vaccine supplies."
The FDA and the American Society of Health-System Pharmacists
maintain web sites for tracking drug shortages.' The sites also

issues raised with studies involving children, the industry is also concerned
with the legal liability associated with pediatric research and the risk of "longterm adverse effects." Id. The lack of available pediatric "safety and dosing

information" forces physicians into "off-label" prescribing. Id. at 520. Of the
top ten drugs prescribed for children, six have not been tested in pediatric
clinical trials.

Breslow, supra note 9, at 148. This poses special risks for

children as evidenced by instances of teeth staining, seizure reactions, cardiac
arrest and even death. Id.
37. Breslow, supra note 9, at 140-44.
38. Jackson, supra note 9, at 204. Investment in fertility and contraception
research declined by ninety percent from its peak in the early 1970's. Id. A
National Academy of Science study confirmed this flight of the pharmaceutical
industry from research and development. Breslow, supra note 9, at 142. Of

eight firms actively involved in this area in the 1970's, within the next decade
only Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation remained. Id. Medical injury claims

from "defective reproductive drugs and devices" were the largest source of tort
recoveries in women. Id. at 141-42.
39. Breslow, supra note 9, at 142.
40. Shortages Give Hospitals Headaches,supra note 8, at 14.

41. Id.
42. Jillene Magill-Lewis, Running on Empty: What's Behind the Current
Rampant Drug Shortages? Pharmacists Want to Know, DRUG TOPICS, Sept.
17, 2001, at 36, 44.
43. Shortages Give Hospitals Headaches,supra note 8, at 15.
44. Magill-Lewis, supra note 42, at 37.

45. See the drug shortage bulletin, supra not 5, which lists thirty-seven
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provide guidelines and information to assist in securing
alternative drugs. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations, the body responsible for accrediting
U.S. hospitals, requires in its new standards that hospitals have
medication management plans for handling drug shortages.'
D. The Culprit
The scarcity of some drugs, and the stifling of research and
development, stems from several sources. Outside the realm of
tort liability, manufacturers cite aging physical plants, difficulty
securing raw materials, industry regulatory concerns and
expiration of patent protections as factors contributing to the
current problem.47 In addition, there are also a number of issues
within the realm of tort liability generating unwelcome risk
exposure. Contributors to high damage awards include the rise of
mass tort class action suits,' the admissibility and use of scientific
evidence49 and a system of dual regulation imposed by the FDA
and common law.5'
While several of these factors are worthy of mention to avoid
the suggestion that tort liability is the sole precipitating cause of
drugs in short supply as of January 31, 2005. For another listing of drugs in
shortage, see the FDA Center for Drug Evaluation & Research webpage at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/shortages/default.htm (last visited on May 25,
2005).
46. Kathi Gannon, JCAHO Plans Major Change for Hospital Surveys in
2004, DRUG TOPICS, Feb. 17, 2003, at HSE23.
47. See Noah, supra note 12, at 377-78 (noting that strict control of
manufacturing facilities and expiration of patents drive profits down and
foster decisions to cease production of certain products); Shortages Give
Hospitals Headaches, supra note 8, at 14 (naming among other contributing
factors to shortages: demand spikes, manufacturing interruptions and lack of
raw materials); Magill-Lewis, supra note 42, at 37 (indicating vulnerability of
raw materials due to dependence on foreign suppliers, as occurred with the
outbreak of mad cow disease and the interruption of the supply of beef protein
needed for manufacture of dexamethasone).
48. Manning, supra note 7, at 208. The availability of class action suits in
the United States was identified as one difference between the American and
Canadian legal systems, which contributes to the greater product liability
costs being observed in the United States. Id. This is exemplified by the
request of plaintiffs' counsel for $550 million in fees for the handling of the
class action litigation of the diet drug fen-phen. Fen-Phen PlaintiffAttorneys
Seek $550 Million in Fees, ANDREWS MED. DEVICES LITIG. REP., Mar. 8, 2002,
at 1.
More recently a trend toward denial of class certification in
pharmaceutical tort actions has been seen. Bruce Kaufman, Emerging Trends
in Drug Suits, Combating Punitive Damages, 31 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 434 (May 19, 2003).
49. See Denemark, supra note 28, at 423-25 (discussing the role of expert
testimony in finding causation in drug liability cases and the circumstances
under which expert testimony may be suspect in those cases).
50. See Manning, supra note 7, at 208; Viscusi et al., supra note 23, at
1438.
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drug and vaccine shortages, it is beyond the scope of this Comment
The remainder of this
to address them in further detail.5
Comment focuses on the conflicts created by dual regulation and a
comparison of three mechanisms to address pharmaceutical
company liability risk.

II. DUAL REGULATION-THE "DOUBLE-EDGED" SWORD
A. The FDA Scheme-"Edge One"
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 and its
subsequent amendments vests the authority to regulate all
in the FDA. 52
Through this agency,
pharmaceuticals
pharmaceutical manufacturers must submit extensive information
to enable the FDA to determine whether the drug in question is
safe-that is, whether the drug's potential benefits outweigh any
risks associated with its use.' Only with an affirmative finding
can a drug be licensed for sale.' Completion of the entire approval
process for a single new drug costs, on average, $200 million, and
can require as long as twelve years to complete.55
In addition to clinical trials, manufacturers must also submit
a proposed label in conformance with the FDA's labeling standards
of bringing a
for approval.' The FDA's control over this aspect
7
drug to market is critical to findings of liability.6
Regulation of a drug by the FDA does not stop with its
The FDA also conducts post-market
approval for sale.
surveillance to overcome limitations inherent in all pre-market

51.
52.
53.
54.

Noah, supra note 12, at 377.
A Question of Competence, supra note 12, at 775.
Id. at 776; Brown, supra note 4, at 6.
See Vicusi, supra note 6, at 580 (commenting that the FDA's risk-

benefit analysis recognizes that drugs are not "risk-free" and their availability
rests on what is in "society's best health interest").
55. Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining
the Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 461, 486 (1997).

56. FDA regulation requires a drug label to contain the following
information: a description, clinical pharmacology, indications and usage,
contraindications, warnings, precautions, adverse reactions, drug abuse and

dependence, overdosage, dosage and administration and how supplied. 21
C.F.R. § 201.56(d)(1)(2005). By standardizing drug labeling, the FDA assists
the physician in processing information on a drug's known risks through a
uniform format and language. Viscusi et al., supra note 23, at 1442.
57. The modification of FDA rules now allow a manufacturer to include a
warning of an adverse side effect without prior agency approval. 21 C.F.R.
§ 201.57(e). On a practical basis, this mechanism is seldom utilized out of
concern on the part of manufacturers of the need to maintain the FDA's
"goodwill." Denemark, supra note 28, at 431. Additionally, FDA regulations
specifically restrict the addition of warnings to known, not theoretical, risks.
21 C.F.R. §201.57(d).
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clinical trials.'
Pharmaceutical companies and physicians are
required to report any adverse drug reactions ("ADRs") to the
FDA.59 The submission of ADRs may lead to labeling changes, use
restrictions or market withdrawal of the drug.'
B. DrugProductLiability-"Edge Two"
Pharmaceutical product liability litigation has historically
been treated somewhat differently than the strict liability
standard established in section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts.6 Comment (k)"' provides an exception to strict liability
where a product is deemed to be "unavoidably unsafe.'
Some
courts adopt comment (k) where pharmaceuticals are involved;
others confer immunity from strict liability only where adequate
warnings are provided; still others decide the issue "on a case-bycase basis."'
The more recently adopted Restatement (Third) of Torts
section 6 provides another framework for courts to apply. 5 A
58. Brown, supra note 4, at 7; A Question of Competence, supra note 12, at
777. The limitations of clinical trials to identify all potential "risks associated
with use of a drug" include the homogeneity of the population comprising the
study group as compared to the population who will use the drug; the rare
frequency of some complications which may not occur during the testing
period; and the difficulty in anticipating certain side effects and a mechanism
to detect these during the investigation. Green, supra note 55, at 496.
59. Viscusi et al., supra note 23, at 1446-47.
60. See id. at 1447-48 (discussing "post-marketing labeling changes").
61. Id. at 1457-59.
62. Comment (k), entitled "Unavoidably unsafe products," provides:
There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use ....
[B]ecause of lack of time and opportunity for
sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or...
purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the
marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable
risk. The seller of such products.., is not to be held to strict liability
for unfortunate consequences attending to their use.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
63. Viscusi et al., supra note 23, at 1457-58.
64. Brown, supra note 4, at 17-18. The lack of predictability under varying
liability rules has contributed to an increase in the cost and complexity of
litigation. "As a result, the total transaction costs of litigation now exceed the
total recoveries of all claimants." Viscusi et al., supra note 23, at 1461.
Compare Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1068 (8th Cir. 1989) (adopting
comment (k) defense where a drug is properly manufactured and includes
proper warnings), with Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 383 (N.J.
1984) (holding that as a "matter of law and policy" that all prescription drugs
are not unavoidably unsafe; it is instead a case-by-case determination).
65. The section provides:
(a) A manufacturer of a prescription drug ... who sells or otherwise
distributes a defective drug.., is subject to liability for harm to persons
caused by the defect ....
(b) For purposes of liability under Subsection (a), a prescription drug...
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manufacturer's compliance with FDA requirements would be
"relevant and admissible" concerning the proper standard of care
Under section 7, comment (e),
to be met, but "not dispositive."
courts may selectively treat compliance with a specific regulation
in a products liability action as conclusive if it is "current,
protective, salient and the product of untainted regulatory
expertise." 7
As with any product liability action, drugs may be considered
On a
defective in design, manufacture or for failure to warn.'
practical basis, compliance with FDA required good manufacturing
practice69 standards limits litigation in the area of drug design and
manufacturing defects. 70 The very nature of drug composition does
not lend itself to alternative design, as might be expected with

is defective if at the time of sale or other distribution the drug...
(1) contains a manufacturing defect.., or
(2) is not reasonably safe due to defective design... or
(3) is not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or
warnings ....
(c) A prescription drug... is not reasonably safe due to defective design
if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug... are sufficiently
great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable
health-care providers ...would not prescribe the drug... for any class
of patients.
(d) A prescription drug... is not reasonably safe due to inadequate
instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings
regarding foreseeable risks of harm are not provided to:
(1) prescribing... health-care providers ... or
(2) the patient ....
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 (1998). See Stahl v.

Novartis Pharm., 283 F.3d 254, 267 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing section 6 of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts and Louisiana product liability requirement that
a warning must be "adequate to reasonably inform the recipient" of the risks).
But see Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 124, 129 n.6 (D. Conn. 1999)
(discussing Connecticut drug product liability law and the court's adherence to
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) over Restatement (Third)).
66. Green, supra note 55, at 462.
67. Id. at 465-66.
68. Brown, supra note 4, at 18.
69. 21 C.F.R. §§ 211.1-.208. The FDA established comprehensive and
detailed regulations described as "good manufacturing practice" standards for
all pharmaceutical manufacturers to follow. Id. These regulations encompass
standards for personnel, facilities, equipment, control of components,
production and process control, packaging and distribution, laboratory
controls, records and reports and returned and salvaged drug products. Id.
70. See Brown, supra note 4, at 18 (discussing the areas of design and
manufacturing defects). Manufacturing defects in the scheme of drug product
litigation seldom occur and are ordinarily not controversial; instead the drug
simply "fail[s] the manufacturer's own standards." Id. "The Restatement
Third § 8(b)(1) imposes strict liability for [pharmaceutical] manufacturing
defects." Green, supra note 55, at 470-71. Design defect claims are similarly
uncommon. Id. at 471-73.

20051

PharmaceuticalTort Liability

other durable good "design claims."7
Thus, the vast majority of drug product liability falls under
the rubric of failure to warn; be it accuracy, adequacy or
timeliness."' Given the previously noted control of the FDA with
regard to drug labeling, the tension between complying with FDA
requirements and the decisions of a common law jury as to what is
an adequate warning leave the industry grappling with this
"double-edged sword." 3
III. ALTERNATIVE

APPROACHES:

A CURE

FOR WHAT AILS US

Having considered the background and impact of tort liability
on drug access and innovation, an analysis of three different
approaches for addressing this issue follows. Two alternatives, the
regulatory compliance defense and the no-fault compensation
model, limit liability by changing tort rules.74 A third alternative,
the voluntary incentives approach, works indirectly on the liability
problem by providing financial incentives
to stimulate

71. See Green, supra, note 55, at 471-72 (noting the Restatement (Third)
does impose liability for a design defect "without proof of an alternative
design" where a court determines a drug's overall risks outweigh its benefits).
72. Id. at 472-73. The sufficiency of the label with respect to failure to
warn liability provides a strong incentive for manufacturers to add any
possible negative side effects.
Jackson, supra note 9, at 212-13.
FDA
regulations are intended to control this tendency to avoid information overload
and the potential for serious warnings to be glossed over. Id. See also Carlin
v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Cal. 1996) (noting manufacturers are
prevented by FDA regulation from including warnings concerning "every
conceivable adverse reaction").
73. Viscusi, supra note 6, at 585-86. A target for liability actions in the
mid-80's, pharmaceutical manufacturers were sued in federal court with
"higher mean damages awards relative to sales than the rest of the U.S.
manufacturing sector." Id. at 585. Their "ratio of liability costs to sales...
dwarfed that for the rest of the manufacturing industries in the U.S." Id. In
spite of more recent settlements, potentially destructive exposure exists. Id.
at 586. An example of the tension created by dual regulation is evidenced in a
jury award of $3.1 million in compensatory and $124.5 million in punitive
damages to a plaintiff who was blinded when inadvertently injected in the eye
with Depo-Medrol. Joseph A. Mahoney, Senate Bill 640: Proposed Federal
ProductLiability Reform and Its PotentialEffect on PharmaceuticalCases and
Punitive Damages, 36 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 475, 475 (1991). The trial judge
precluded admissibility of evidence that the manufacturer had requested the
inclusion of a disclaimer on the label that uses around the eye were not
approved. Id. at 476. The FDA denied the requested label modification. Id.
Here the manufacturer's full compliance with the FDA's labeling standards
resulted in a failure to warn and tort liability as assessed by the court. Id. at
475-76.
74. Schafer v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 20 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1994) (discussing
the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act as a no-fault remedial scheme).
See also Margaret Gilhooley, Innovative Drugs, Products Liability, Regulatory
Compliance, and Patient Choice, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1481, 1484 (1994)
(discussing regulatory compliance and the limits on liability it should have).
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pharmaceutical company investment in research, development and
manufacture of otherwise financially unattractive drug product
lines.75 With a problem of this complexity, a cure requires more
than one approach.
A. Regulatory Compliance Defense-PreemptionRevisited
To eliminate the conflict existing between compliance with
the FDA and state tort law, many legal commentators advocate
adoption of an "FDA" or regulatory compliance defense'6 under the
doctrine of preemption.77 Where pharmaceutical manufacturers
fully comply with FDA regulations, a regulatory compliance
defense would "insulate" them from tort liability and exposure to
punitive damages.'
Current FDA regulations do not provide for express
preemption of state tort liability.79 The limited application of
preemption thus far depends upon the actions of a few state
legislatures" and the interpretation of the courts.8 In the latter

75. Cooper, supra note 36, at 519.
76. Jackson, supra note 9, at 224-25.
77. See John F. Del Giorno, Federal Preemption of Prescription Drug
Labeling: Antidote for Pharmaceutical Industry Overdosing on State Court
Jury Decisions in ProductLiability Cases, 22 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 629, 635-36
(1989)(stating that under authority of the Supremacy Clause, when Congress
legislates "in a field of dominant federal interest," state laws pertaining to this
field are not enforceable, and are thus preempted).
78. Green, supra note 55, at 464-65.
79. A Question of Competence, supra note 12, at 786.
80. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-701 (2003) (providing protection from punitive
damages where manufacturers receive approval from the FDA and have not
misrepresented or withheld information known to be "relevant to the harm...
plaintiff allegedly suffered"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2 (2003) (providing that
punitive damages may not be awarded where manufacturer has "received
premarket approval or licensure" by the FDA and has not "knowingly withheld
or misrepresented information... relevant to the claimant's harm"); OR. REV.
STAT. § 30.927 (2001) (providing no liability for punitive damages where drug
is "recognized as safe and effective pursuant to... [FDA] regulations" and
manufacturer did not knowingly withhold or misrepresent information to the
FDA or physician); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 2000) (precluding
liability for "harm caused by a failure to warn if the product contains an
adequate warning" and providing a rebuttable presumption that compliance
with FDA standards is an adequate warning).
81. The court in Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, Inc. granted summary judgment
for a manufacturer on a products liability claim stating '[the FDA dictates the
contents of the label for Adderall(R) and defendants were prohibited from
changing it without prior approval from the FDA .... This concept sounds in
preemption." 233 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1197-98 (D.N.D. 2002). In a products
liability action involving implantable contraceptive capsules, the court stated
"[flor all practical purposes, absent deliberate concealment or nondisclosure
of... harmful effects, compliance with FDA standards should be virtually
dispositive of such claims." Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1259
(N.J. 1999).
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case, common law precedents follow an anti-preemption
presumption in areas of public health and safety-traditional state
concerns.82 Even iin cases where courts acknowledge that tort
liability exposure may have detrimental effects on drug access and
cost, they dismiss this impact as "too speculative for judicial
consideration.'
Critics of the FDA defense, in relying on the common law,
claim that FDA regulations are designed only as minimum
standards.' Further, the resources of the FDA are insufficient to
meet the demands of the agency functioning as the sole protector
of the healthcare consumer.' Without the overarching deterrence
provided by tort liability, the FDA is more vulnerable to agency
capture-where the FDA is "controlled" by the industry it is
charged with regulating.'
Lastly, opponents of a regulatory compliance defense point to
the differing goals of dual regulation. Imposition of an FDA
defense would defeat the objective of a tort system which focuses
on compensating the individual victim injured by a defective
drug.87
In contrast, the FDA makes global risk-benefit
determinations to insure the safety of a drug for use by the general
public.'
Proponents of preemption cite the pervasiveness of the FDA's
regulation and challenge those who characterize compliance as
meeting only minimum standards.' Given the general exclusion

82. Caraker v. Sandoz, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1032 (S.D. Ill.
2001) ("In the
absence of express preemption, there is a strong 'basic assumption' that
Congress did not intend to displace state law.").
83. A Question of Competence, supra note 12, at 787.
84. See Gilhooley, supra note 74, at 1485 (claiming that even courts view
FDA labeling as minimal); Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance:The
Pursuit of Symmetry in Products Liability, 88 GEO L.J. 2147, 2152 (2000)
(arguing that courts should take safety standards more seriously, even though
there is no obligation to do so).
85. See Gilhooley, supra note 74, at 1488 (discussing the ALI Reporters
Study finding that a compliance defense should apply only where there are
adequate resources within the FDA to receive and evaluate product
information from the industry); Green, supra note 55, at 476 (citing a 1991
FDA study finding that the agency's mandate for regulation of drugs far
exceeds its funding).
86. Gilhooley, supra note 74, at 1489.
87. Jackson, supra note 9, at 221-22 (commenting that the state's interest
in compensating drug related injury in a tort action is in opposition to the
federal interest of insuring a safe drug supply).
88. Id. The broader focus on "safety questions" by the FDA is preferable to
regulatory impact created by a jury "fixated" on a "needy plaintiff' and
awarding damages without, in some cases, regard for product defect or
causation. Noah, supra note 84, at 2163.
89. Viscusi et al., supra note 23, at 1478 (commenting "the FDCA does not
establish minimum standards for prescription drug[s]"); Jackson, supra note 9,
at 217-18 (noting "the FDA and manufacturers... regard regulatory oversight
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of drugs from strict liability, a manufacturer's compliance with
FDA requirements effectively negates any "conscious, flagrant
indifference" on the part of the manufacturer in the design,
manufacture and labeling of the drug.'° Advocates of preemption
also emphasize that where a manufacturer is guilty of fraud or
misrepresentation, the protections of an FDA defense are lost.9'
A jury finding of negligence is, in effect, saying the "thorough
and painstaking" review and approval of the FDA is wrong.92 The
ability of a lay jury to assess complex information required in
determining the safety and efficacy of a drug as compared to the
institutional competence of the FDA is questionable at best.93
Somewhat paradoxically, courts consider failure to comply with
FDA regulations as negligence per se.94 This failure equates to an
It is inconsistent to hold that a
absence of reasonable care.'
manufacturer's compliance with FDA requirements is merely
"some evidence," but not presumptive of reasonable care.96
B. No-Fault Compensation-TheNational Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act
Congressional response to the vaccine crisis of the 1970's and
1980's resulted in the passage of the NCVIA in 1986. 9' The Act
sought to stabilize the vaccine market and encourage further
research and development through a no-fault compensation
The Act
scheme that modified traditional tort actions.9
established special claims procedures requiring an injured party to
seek redress through the "Vaccine Court" before pursuing any
other civil remedy. 99 An advantage for plaintiffs is the expedited
processing of claims without the need to prove causation where an

as a comprehensive determination of safety").
90. Mahoney, supra note 73, at 512.
91. Viscusi et al., supra note 23, at 1478 (seeing tort liability as an effective
regulatory measure only in situations where a drug manufacturer has
misrepresented information or behaved fraudulently with respect to its
obligations under the FDCA).
92. Mahoney, supra note 73, at 512.
93. Jackson, supra note 9, at 218-19. Jackson discusses the incongruity of

case-by-case jury determinations made with the "bright light of hindsight" on
small samples of data with the complex, multidisciplinary FDA evaluation

that a new drug application must complete to determine the safety and
efficacy of the product. Id. Where jury findings contradict the FDA's labeling

requirements the scientific basis for adequate warning to physicians is
supplanted. Id. at 219-20.
94. Mahoney, supra note 73, at 513 & n.320.

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Breslow, supra note 9, at 141.
98. Schafer, 20 F.3d at 2-3.

99. Id.
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"on-table" injury exists." The calculation of damages follows a
formula provided in the Act and are paid out of a fund created
from excise taxes assessed on vaccines administered and covered
under the program."'
The Act provides a presumption of adequate warning when a
manufacturer complies with the FDA's requirements."2 It limits
punitive damages and precludes compensation for injuries
resulting from "unavoidable side effects." 03 Following NCVIA's
implementation, vaccine prices stabilized, immunization rates
The large vaccine
improved and vaccine development resumed.'
more predictable
the
under
jury awards of the past disappeared
10 5
exposure of this no-fault program.
Notwithstanding NCVIA's accomplishments, this no-fault
system is not a panacea. While claim processing is faster, as
compared with traditional tort litigation, the program still
struggles with proof of causation and inherent limits to the vaccine
injury table that attempts to deal with this issue.01 6 Petitioners
see more than two-thirds of filed claims dismissed,' while the
industry remains cautious of risk exposure for vaccines not
M
Further manufacturer
covered under the legislation."
consolidation and economic decisions to abandon these product
lines in favor of more profitable classes of drugs eroded the early
gains made by NCVIA with respect to stabilizing the vaccine
market."
The government's involvement in providing an alternative to
tort liability is unique for vaccines because of mandated
immunization."0 Declines in immunization rates have significant
public health implications and provide a strong incentive for
100. Derry Ridgway, No Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 59, 63
(1999). The statute provides a rebuttable presumption of causation where the
vaccine is included in the table and the type of injury occurred within the

specified time period from inoculation. Id.
101. Id. at 64. Compensation under the NCVIA 'includes nonreimbursable
medical expenses, rehabilitation, lost wages, and a pain and suffering award
that may not exceed $250,000." Jackson, supra note 9, at 224.
102. Schafer, 20 F.3d at 3.

103. Id.
104. Ridgway, supra note 100, at 76-77.

105. Id. at 77-78.
106. See Breen, supra note 13, at 326-28 (claiming the 'system of recovery" is
unfair with respect to the discretion of the special master, timing
requirements and the structure of the table); Ridgway, supra note 100, at 71,
73-74 (discussing differences and difficulties of 'legal and scientific causal
reasoning" under the NCVIA).
107. Breen, supra note 13, at 320.
108. Noah, supra note 12, at 393.
109. Id. at 374 (commenting '[tihe [NCVIA] helped to stabilize the pediatric

vaccine market, but supply problems persist").
110. Schafer, 20 F.3d at 2.
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government protection of the vaccine supply.' Unlike other drugs
that are taken or administered voluntarily, the mandate of
immunization creates a "societal obligation"
to compensate those
2
unavoidably injured by vaccination.1
The question remains whether the legislature is willing to
intervene and provide liability protection mechanisms for other
classes of drugs where there is a choice whether to "consume" the
product."' With an industry that today is viewed by many as
profit driven, and more than able to afford the risk attendant to its
sales, public perception of drug manufacturers is not as favorable
as it once was.""
C. Voluntary FinancialIncentives-The Best
Pharmaceuticalsfor Children Act
To avoid the significant risk of tort liability in a small market
segment of pharmaceuticals, drug companies avoided testing and
marketing their products for children.1
This condones a practice
of "off-label" prescribing and leaves physicians guessing as to
proper pediatric dosing."'
Rather than tackle tort exposure
directly as a solution, legislation focused on an incentive system
111. Noah, supra note 12, at 375 (noting that vaccine shortages have the
potential to undue the "gains made against infectious disease" in the last fifty
years).
112. Ridgway, supra note 100, at 79; Schafer, 20 F.3d at 2 (stating that the
government's vaccination mandate imposed a concomitant responsibility to
provide compensation to those injured as a result of complying).
113. Ridgway, supra note 100, at 83. In discussing the applicability of the
NCVIA as a model for other no-fault coverage, Ridgway remarks that vaccines
are the only product whose use is mandated by law and that this status
creates a powerful argument for their "special treatment." Id.
114. Spahn & Carr, supra note 6, at 2. Pharmaceutical manufacturers have
been swept along in the tarnishing of healthcare's image as a result of
managed care and "exploding" costs. Id. The media, politicians, attorneys and
consumer groups have "regularly accuse[d] the pharmaceutical and medical
device industry... of sacrificing safety for the sake of large, 'unfair' profits."
Id. The industry has responded through direct-to-consumer public relations
efforts of their own. Id. at 3. The FDA and the drug industry are currently
attempting to thwart the implementation of an internet-based prescription
service that allows employees of Springfield, Massachusetts to buy their drugs
from Canada at savings of thirty-five to sixty percent. Mike Doming, Town
Leaps at CanadianDrugs, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14, 2003, § 1, at 1. The plan is
projected to save the city $9 million annually in drug expenditures. Id.
115. Breslow, supra note 9, at 140-42.
In addition to the industry's
unfavorable tort experience with pediatric vaccines, the unwillingness of
pharmaceutical manufacturers to test drugs in children is linked to a similar
high-risk exposure involving "women's reproductive systems." Id. at 141-42.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers avoid pediatric testing and labeling of their
products due to legal liability from clinical trials; perceived delays in the
approval process; ethical issues where children are study participants and the
supply of qualified pediatric investigators. Cooper, supra note 36, at 520.
116. Breslow, supra note 9, at 140-41, 146-47.
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117
for pharmaceutical manufacturers.
The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of 2002 ("BPCA"),
passed as successor legislation to the Food & Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997 ("FDAMA")."8 The BPCA continues a
voluntary incentive program that began under the FDAMA for
pharmaceutical manufacturers to conduct pediatric studies in
exchange for six months of exclusivity or patent extensions for
already marketed drugs."9 The BPCA also provides funding for
public and private testing on drugs that pharmaceutical
companies opt not to study.'
Currently, incentive program results indicate that the BPCA
has succeeded in building a more vigorous pediatric research
infrastructure. 2 ' Labeling of drugs for pediatric use increased. 2 '
However, as with the no-fault compensation alternative, the
incentive program approach has its drawbacks."
Critics of the BPCA take issue with the windfall profits
garnered by pharmaceutical manufacturers through their
The costs of conducting studies for pediatric
participation.
applications are dwarfed by the return of profits in the hundreds
As an example,
of millions of dollars through patent extensions.'
the value of patent extensions for several common drugs yielded as
much as $900 million to $1.4 billion in additional revenue."' By
contrast, the average cost to study a drug for pediatric use ranges
from $500,000 to $20 million, with an average per study cost of

117. Cooper, supra note 36, at 519.
118. Breslow, supra note 9, at 133-34.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 134. "Congress appropriated $200 million" in 2002 for taxpayer
supported pediatric testing for studies that the pharmaceutical manufacturers
elected not to conduct. Id. at 134.
121. Id. at 164 (noting testing capacity for pediatric studies at the National

Institute for Children's Health and Development increased from seven to
thirteen units to accommodate need in working with pharmaceutical
companies); Christopher-Paul Milne, Exploring the Frontiers of Law and
Science: FDAMA's PediatricStudies Incentive, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 491, 499500 (2002) (reporting results of the Tufts CSDD survey indicating a doubling
in the number of pediatric studies to be initiated under BPCA as compared
with studies begun under the FDAMA).
122. Breslow, supranote 9, at 164.

123. Id. at 165. (noting problems in exclusivity under FDAMA related to
windfall profits from patent extensions, lack of incentives to ensure neonatal

testing, "failure to address off-patent and off-exclusivity drugs" and
insufficient means to require pediatric labeling). Id. at 165-66.
124. Id. at 167.
125. Id. at 168.
126. Id. (estimating revenue gains from pediatric exclusivity protection at:
Claritin-$975 million, Prozac-$831 million, Glucophage-$648

million,

Pepcid-$290 million, Vasotec-$318 million and Buspar-$284 million (citing
Rachel Zimmerman, Child Play: PharmaceuticalFirms Win Big on Plan to
Test Adult Drugson Kids, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2001, at Al)).
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$3.87 million.
Ultimately, the cost of incentives provided under the BPCA is
shouldered by the consumer, most notably seniors, who pay higher
drug prices while generic alternatives experience delayed
introduction into the market.'
With Congress' recent action to
implement prescription drug coverage for seniors, this particular
criticism of pediatric exclusivity may be somewhat mitigated. 9
Advocates of the BPCA, including the American Academy of
Pediatrics, point to the program's favorable impact on pediatric
research and testing. ° An FDA study of five pediatric illnesses
attributed a "substantial portion of th[e] higher hospitalization
rate[s] [experienced in children] to the lack of informed drug
treatment." 3 '
The FDA projected that a twenty-five percent
reduction in the disparity between adult and pediatric admissions
for just those illnesses studied would yield annual savings of $228

million. 232
In this example, the benefits of an industry incentive program
can be measured with some reasonable degree of certainty. The
un-quantified cost of drugs that are not available because of
research and innovation abandoned or never undertaken due to
unacceptable liability risk should also be considered in this
equation. 33 Those who support the voluntary incentives offered
under the BPCA consider what price to place on a child's health.
Opponents of an incentive approach claim consumers are paying
the drug companies to do something, in this case pediatric testing,
which is already their ethical and regulatory obligation. 3'
Regardless of the merits of either argument, pharmaceutical
127. Milne, supra note 121, at 501.
128. Cooper, supra note 36, at 540-41. By granting or extending patent
exclusivity under the BPCA, delays in the availability of generic substitutes

occur. Id. This places a disproportionate cost burden on the elderly and those
without health insurance. Id. at 541. See also Nat'l Pharm. Alliance v.
Henney, 47 F. Supp. 2d 37, 41 (D.D.C. 1999). In a suit by manufacturers of
generic drugs against the FDA, concerning the agency's interpretation of the

FDAMA, the court held "the loss of six months" profit due to the grant of
patent exclusivity to an innovator drug manufacturer would not result in
"business failures" or insurmountable obstacles to introduction of generic
producers' products to market. Id. Further, the court noted the detrimental
impact on generic drug producers was considered by Congress at the time the

FDAMA was enacted. Id.
129. Cooper, supra note 36, at 541; Patches for the Drug Program, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, § 4, at 14.
130. Breslow, supra note 9, at 162-63.

131. Id. at 164.
132. Id.
133. Viscusi et al., supra note 23, at 1445.
134. Breslow, supra note 9, at 163 (describing pediatrician comments that

industry benefits under the BPCA is justified in light of the gains in pediatric
information and research realized).
135. Id. at 163, 192.
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companies have the ultimate choice whether or not to produce a
drug. If tort liability risk significantly compromises profitability,
altruism will not trump shareholder accountability.'
IV. A RECOMMENDED PRESCRIPTION
A multi-faceted approach is required to successfully address
the unfavorable impact of tort liability on the pharmaceutical
industry.'37
Implementation of an FDA defense coupled with
appropriately tailored incentive programs can create the requisite
business environment to a pharmaceutical company's decision to
pursue development and marketing of otherwise unprofitable
drugs and vaccines. The implementation of preemption legislation
and incentive measures represent a substantial, though not total,
solution to the drug access and innovation dilemma." Like most
complex problems, resolution must begin with incremental, yet
significant, progress.
A. Changingthe Tort Rules
The significant advantages of assigning decisions regarding
drug safety to the institutional competence of the FDA far
outweigh the usurpation of the jury in a common law action.9
Pharmaceutical product liability has been a costly, inefficient and
largely ineffective means of promoting the public health and the
manufacture of safer drugs.4'"
To avoid the conflicts of dual
regulation,'
an FDA defense should be provided where
136. Magill-Lewis, supra note 42, at 36-38.
137. See Noah, supra note 12, at 403 (identifying steps the government could
take to improve the "business climate" including tort liability protection,

flexibility in regulation of manufacturing facilities, increasing emergency drug
stockpiles and avoiding government cost containment through overly
aggressive price controls).
138. Id. at 402-03.
139. See Viscusi, supra note 6, at 586, 589 (claiming jurors improperly assess
risk and cost-benefit analyses, which provided further justification for
deferring to regulatory agencies the responsibility of "deterring corporate
misbehavior"). An example of the uncertain liability in tort actions is seen in
the decision in Wells v. Ortho Pharm.Corp., 615 F. Supp 262 (1985). Ignoring
scientific evidence which showed no connection between the use of spermicidal
jelly and the alleged birth defect, the judge ruled against Ortho in a multimillion dollar judgment on the basis of the "demeanor and tone" of the expert
witness. Brown, supra note 4, at 27-28. The case has not since been followed,
even in the district rendering the decision. Id.
140. See A Question of Competence, supra note 12, at 784 (citing the
inefficiency of the tort system and its failure to provide compensation to a
large number of injured); Viscusi et al., supra note 23, at 1480 (noting the
"perverse incentives" and social harm which occurred in the Bendectin and
DPT vaccine litigation); Jackson, supra note 9, at 237 (claiming "regulation"
imposed by the common law is an inadequate compensatory mechanism and
"risk deterrent").
141. See A Question of Competence, supra note 12, at 773 (describing dual
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pharmaceutical manufacturers fully comply with all agency
requirements for testing, reporting and surveillance."" However,
this affirmative defense would not be available where a
manufacturer is guilty of fraud or misrepresentation with respect
to its compliance with FDA regulations, or where the FDA itself
was "errant" in its judgment."
In these circumstances
compensation for an individual's drug related injuries would not
be precluded.'"
To respond to those legitimate concerns regarding the ability
of the FDA to assume a heightened protector role, adoption of
preemptive legislation should also include provisions for increased
agency funding and staffing resources.1"
These will ensure
adequate resources for effective oversight following new drug
application approval and post-clinical trial period when many
safety issues are first identified."
To mitigate perceptions of
agency capture, Congress should avoid further expansion of
pharmaceutical industry funding of FDA operations to ensure
autonomy of the agency in its regulatory role.'
The choice of an FDA defense over the expansion of no-fault
compensation programs modeled after the NCVIA is predicated on
the broader application that tort protection preemption legislation
M

regulation as the confrontation of tort liability and FDA compliance giving rise
to higher costs, adverse impact on drug research and development and
interference with the objectives of the FDA).
142. Viscusi et al., supra note 23, at 1478; Viscusi, supra note 6, at 588;
Brown, supra note 4, at 40. Some advocates of an FDA defense limit
preemptive effect to the award of punitive damages only as exemplified by a
handful of states (Arizona, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon and Utah) passing
legislation to that effect. Id.
143. A Question of Competence, supra note 12, at 791-93. The courts have
historically considered failure to abide by the regulations of the FDA as
negligence per se. Id. at 791. Additionally, improper decision made by the
FDA must be included as a basis to circumvent preemption, allowing a private
action to proceed. Id.
144. Id. at 793.
145. Gilhooley, supra note 74, at 1488. See also Green, supra note 55, at 476
(quoting an FDA study that the agency cannot "'execute all of its statutory
responsibilities within the limitations of existing resources'").
146. Id. at 498-99. Legal requirements to do so aside, there is evidence of
under-reporting of adverse drug reactions. Id. at 499. The FDA currently
lacks sufficient resources to monitor compliance and assess the reported
information and its implications on a drug's use and labeling. Id.
147. Alison R. McCabe, A PrecariousBalancingAct-The Role of the FDA as
Protector of Public Health and Industry Wealth, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 787,
792-93 (2003). To respond to public criticism regarding the time required for
FDA approval of a drug, Congress enacted the Prescription Drug User Fee Act
which assesses a user fee on pharmaceutical companies submitting new drug
applications. Id. The money received from the drug industry is used to
expand FDA resources. Id. The FDA's dependency on these funds has
generated concern that the FDA's role as an independent regulator may be
compromised. Id. at 818-19; Milne, supra note 121, at 512.
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While successful in addressing the vaccine crisis, no-

fault compensation programs are less attractive where there are
no public health mandates justifying direct government
involvement in the tort scheme. 49
No-fault compensation
programs continue to wrestle with issues of scientific versus legal
causation even in programs like the NCVIA, where there is a
common basis for identifying and categorizing immunization
injuries."' 0
These issues-the lack of public policy favoring government
assumed liability and the difficulty of issues of proof that remain
in
no-fault schemes-limit the application
of no-fault
compensation alternatives as a remedy for tort liability. 5 ' The
enactment of a federal standard with respect to drug product
liability through adoption of an FDA defense will create the
needed uniformity missing from fragmented, state-based tort
reform.'52
B. Adjunct Therapy: Incentive Alternatives
It is recommended that in order to augment the benefits
derived from the implementation of an FDA defense, it should
include selective incentive programs modeled after those
developed for pediatric drugs. The greater degree of certainty
resulting from elimination of dual regulation is insufficient to
stimulate research and development among certain categories of
drugs and biologicals without additional incentives.
Incentive
programs should be
offered where
the
pharmaceutical industry abandoned or avoided investment due to
risk and its negative impact on profit." A balance must be struck
in crafting incentives to provide sufficient rewards in order to
generate a reasonable return on investment without creating the
M

148. See Noah, supra note 12, at 392-94 (citing liability concerns of vaccine
manufacturers for those products not covered under the NCVIA).
149. See generally Denis J. Hauptly & Mary Mason, The National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act, 37 FED. B. NEWS & J. 452 (1990).
150. Id. (suggesting no-fault programs work only where formulas can be
applied, such as the "table" used to establish presumptive causation of vaccine
injury); Ridgway, supra note 100, at 71, 73. Even with the injury table,
Ridgway notes that determination of causation remains a problem for the
NCVIA. Id. Elimination of "case-by-case scientific determinations of
eligibility" is necessary for an effective no-fault compensation model. Id. at 87.
151. Ridgway, supra note 100, at 80, 83.
152. Viscusi et al., supra note 23, at 1477.
153. Noah, supra note 12, at 402-03; Brown, supra note 4, at 46 (noting the
provision of financial incentives without protection for tort liability will leave
the problem only partially resolved).
154. See Brown, supra note 4, at 32, 38 (describing the abandonment of
research and development in the field of contraception and recommending,
among other remedies, inclusion of the drug product line in an incentive-type
program).
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windfall profits that fuel legitimate criticism of such programs."'
Incentives must be structured to stimulate investment in
those specific drugs and drug product lines where there is a true
need for attention.'56 A criticism of the earlier pediatric exclusivity
legislation was the ability of the manufacturer to complete studies
and receive patent protections for drugs with minimal benefit for
the pediatric population. 5 7 Where patent protections form the
basis of incentives, expertise within the FDA on patent law can
assist in controlling potential abuse. 5 '
Limitations on incentives must also be built into a program's
design.59
Options include caps on profits realized through
participation (including guarantees on market exclusivity),
reimbursement linked to any favorable economic impact on
healthcare spending generated by the studies and labeling
changes, and incentive compensation based on a multiplier of a
manufacturer's research and development costs.'60
Committed collaboration must occur among pharmaceutical
manufacturers, the FDA and the medical community. As with the
BPCA, time limits should be established to formally assess any
incentive program's effectiveness to insure it yields results
justifying the financial rewards it provides.'
Pharmaceutical
companies must behave responsibly to avoid the conclusion that
incentive programs are merely political favors granted to an

155. See Breslow, supra note 9, at 189 (discussing the extraordinary costs
born by consumers under the BPCA).
156. McCabe, supra note 147, at 813; John D. Pinzone, Note, The Affordable
PrescriptionDrug Act: A Solution for Today's High PrescriptionDrug Prices,
16 J.L. & HEALTH 145, 167 (2001). An NIHC study recently confirmed that
direct-to-consumer advertising accounts for a majority of spending from new

drug profits. The funds generated from patent protection are now diverted
from research and development to marketing of pharmaceutical products. Id.
157. Breslow, supra note 9, at 171-72. Under the FDAMA, pharmaceutical
manufacturers were eligible for six-month patent extensions on the completion
of pediatric studies without a requirement for label changes. Id. at 171.

Consequently, the FDA encountered resistance to requested label changes
with "unfavorable pediatric research results." Id. In just two studies where
no labeling changes resulted, manufacturers garnered $2.3 billion in patent
extension benefits. Id. at 172. With enactment of the BPCA, stronger
measures have been instituted to allow the FDA to declare a drug misbranded
if the manufacturer refuses to make recommended labeling changes. Id. at

175.
158. McCabe, supra note 147, at 818.
159. See Breslow, supra note 9, at 183-84 (discussing the House debate on

the BPCA and its disproportionate

cost to consumers for pediatric

pharmaceutical research).
160. Id. at 184, 189.

161. Id. at 181. The BPCA contains a sunset clause and a mandate to HHS
and the Comptroller General to prepare a comprehensive report on the
effectiveness of the legislation including the benefits realized and the cost to
taxpayers. Id.
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industry whose primary goal is "intellectual property protection
and profit."'62
V.

CONCLUSION

In a country that spends more per capita on healthcare than
any other nation in the world," it is ironic that we are confronted
with a serious and growing shortage of drugs and vaccines.
Beholden to stockholders, pharmaceutical companies will simply
not make choices in support of research, manufacture and
marketing of low-margin, high-liability risk drugs.
Successfully addressing access and innovation concerns in the
industry will require creative, and on some level controversial,
approaches to the complex problem. As a starting point within the
realm of tort liability, the provision of a narrowly defined, longadvocated FDA defense should be reconsidered and implemented
at the federal level. Supplementing this tort protection with
selective incentive programs should be done where research into
and access to classes of drugs have been abandoned and where
evidence demonstrates a favorable risk-benefit analysis.

162. See McCabe, supra note 147, at 817 (discussing the political influence of
the pharmaceutical industry and the potential for "agency capture" of the
FDA).
163. U.S. Health Care Gets Checkup from ABC, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 16, 2003,
§ A, at 16.

